

# TrustMesh


A Blockchain-Enabled Trusted Distributed Computing Framework for Open  
Heterogeneous IoT Environments

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# Introduction



## Cloud Layer

- Big data processing
- Data warehousing

## Edge Layer

- Local network
- Data Processing & Reduction
- Data Caching & Buffering
- Control Response
- Virtualization


## Device Layer

- Sensors & Controllers

Primitive View of an Edge Computing Network

# Introduction


Real-world multi-stakeholder environments are much more complex!



# Challenges



- Globally, IoT connections are growing at a CAGR of 16%
- Revenue from these connections is growing at a CAGR of 14%




1. Based on 1,600 publicly known enterprise IoT projects (Not including consumer IoT projects e.g., Wearables, Smart Home). 2. Trend based on comparison with % of projects in the 2016 IoT Analytics Enterprise IoT Projects List. A downward arrow means the relative share of all projects has declined, not the overall number of projects 3. Not including Consumer Smart Home Solutions. Source: IoT Analytics 2018 Global overview of 1,600 enterprise IoT use cases (Jan 2018)

## Multi-Stakeholder Environments



Data Integrity



Lack of Centralized Trust



Stringent Audit Requirements




Device Heterogeneity

# Existing Work




Existing distributed computing frameworks broadly fall under two distinct design philosophies

## Central Coordinator Model



## Distributed Consensus Model





# Existing Work



Existing distributed computing frameworks broadly fall under two distinct design philosophies

## Central Coordinator Model

Allows the use of flexible, non-deterministic scheduling approaches such as **machine learning solutions** and other meta-heuristics

Introduces **single point(s) of failure** making the network susceptible to malicious attacks

## Distributed Consensus Model


In most cases, **fault tolerant** with minimal reliance on individual entities

**Less flexibility** with selection of scheduling approach since consensus requires a deterministic outcome.

# TrustMesh: Bridging the Gap



Allows the use of flexible, non-deterministic scheduling approaches such as **machine learning solutions** and other meta-heuristics **Byzantine fault tolerant** with minimal reliance on individual entities



## Three-Layer Architecture

**Network Management Layer:** Handles system setup and configuration

**Computation Layer:** Runs the blockchain network and processes data

**Perception Layer:** Interfaces with IoT devices

## Key Innovations

- Supports non-deterministic scheduling while maintaining Byzantine fault tolerance using a novel **multi-phase commit protocol**
- Maintains **immutable audit trail** and implements **secure data handling** through blockchain and smart contracts
- Capable of handling **diverse IoT devices** efficiently

# Network Management Layer



## Control Nodes


- Serves as access point for administrators
- Manages applications and workflows without direct data processing
- Not a critical point of failure for ongoing operations

## Application Deployment

- Images pushed to registry, then smart contracts invoked
- Event-driven architecture ensures consistent application deployment


## Workflow Management

- Defines complex processing pipelines as Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs)
- Relationships between applications are immutable once stored





# Computation Layer



## Data Sub-Layer

- **Blockchain Ledger:** Provides an immutable audit trail for all operations
- **Distributed Database:** Handles persistent storage with multi-master architecture
- **Distributed Cache:** Facilitates temporary storage and inter-node communication


## Consensus Sub-Layer

- **PBFT Consensus:** Provides Byzantine fault tolerance for standard operations
- **Multi-Phase Protocol:** Enables non-deterministic scheduling decisions

## Service Sub-Layer


- **Task Executor:** Orchestrates workflow execution according to predefined specifications
- **Schedule Event Handler:** Oversees schedule generation within the computation layer
- **App Image Event Handler:** Processes application management events
- **Resource Registration:** Monitors compute node resources at configured intervals

# Multi-Phase Commit Protocol



IoT Node submits an intent to send data for processing.

# Multi-Phase Commit Protocol




All the compute nodes in the network use a deterministic algorithm to assign the scheduling responsibility to one of the blockchain nodes using PBFT consensus.

$$f(N, R) = n^* \text{ where } n^* = \max_{n \in N} (w_c \cdot c_n + w_m \cdot m_n)$$

with  $c_n$  and  $m_n$  representing available CPU and memory resources for node  $n$ , and  $w_c$ ,  $w_m$  being weighting factors.


# Multi-Phase Commit Protocol



The newly designated scheduler uses the available resource data and a flexible (and pluggable) algorithm to decide on the data processing schedule. All the computes nodes achieve consensus on the generated schedule using PBFT.

We use a Least-Connected Dynamic Weighted Round Robin (LCDWRR) approach for experimentation and demonstration purposes


# Multi-Phase Commit Protocol



Once consensus is achieved, the schedule is stored in the blockchain and the IoT node sends the data to be processed to the assigned node.



# Perception Layer



## Zero-Process Baseline Approach

- Minimalist design optimized for resource-constrained IoT devices
- No running processes by default upon deployment

## Helper Components as Libraries

- **Transaction Initiator:** Encapsulates raw data into secure transaction batches
- **Response Manager:** Implements Curve25519 cryptography for secure communication

## Architectural Benefits


- Lightweight footprint suitable for varied IoT hardware
- Clear separation of data collection and processing concerns
- Adaptable to diverse IoT application requirements

# Experimental Setup




Our Experiments were conducted with a total of **21 nodes** acquired from the **Melbourne Research Cloud**


Node Distribution




OS Distribution (Compute Layer)



Hardware Specifications Comparison




And using a cold-chain monitoring workflow with **3 deployed applications**






# Results

## CPU Usage by Workflow Progression



## RAM Usage by Workflow Progression




- Staggered deployment peaks show two-phase application distribution mechanism
- Minimal resource utilization in Perception Layer throughout operations
- Stable RAM consumption in Computation Layer during operational phases
- Sustained 45% CPU utilization during concurrent data processing
- Resource patterns demonstrate effective workload distribution across heterogeneous nodes
- Stable baseline consumption shows framework efficiency outside peak operations



# Results



Performance Comparison by Testbed Configuration



**Average Round Trip Time:** End-to-end processing duration from initial IoT request to result delivery

**Framework Overhead Time:** Processing time added by TrustMesh, excluding actual application execution

Framework overhead increases linearly from 3.25s to 4.19s as nodes scale from 4 to 16

Only 8.3% increase in round-trip time despite quadrupling nodes (4→16)

Linear overhead increase observed, though PBFT's  $O(n^2)$  complexity suggests this pattern may change with larger node counts

# Results



Both experiments were conducted with **31.25%** of the network configured to accept malicious scheduling attempts

| Metric                 | Scenario 1  | Scenario 2  |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Detection Latency (ms) | 127 ± 15    | 142 ± 18    |
| Recovery Time (s)      | 5.23 ± 0.12 | 5.31 ± 0.15 |
| CPU Utilization (%)    | 45.5        | 47.8        |


Scenario 1: Non-designated nodes attempting to propose schedules (safety property violation)

Scenario 2: Nodes designated to a new request attempting to interfere with already scheduled requests (agreement property violation)




# Q&A

Paper Preprint



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